

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

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OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

10 January 1969

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Dear Mr. Murphy:

In Mr. Johnson's absence, I am sending you the
attached outline of Professor Bell's paper for the
Bilderberg meeting.

Sincerely yours,

Martha

(Mrs.) Martha Sue Tharp
Assistant to the President

The Hon. Robert D. Murphy
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DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

Hamilton Hall

Paper for the Bilderberg Conference: Outline (January 9, 1969)

The Sources of Instability in the United States

Daniel Bell

I. The Crisis of (at worst) Legitimacy; (at best) of Credibility.

- a) The Vietnam War. The war is without parallel in American history is that it is perceived as morally ambiguous if not dubious by a large part of the population, and, in the conduct of the Administration (particularly the official optimism in 1964-65) a problem of credibility has arisen. The Vietnam war goes against the experience of Americans (its moralism, its optimism, its sense of power) and is the most immediate source of disorientation. Historically, from Russia to Bolivia, an immoral and disastrous war has been the source of a crisis of legitimacy.
- b) The alienation of the radical young. In a simple shorthand, I would say that this is the beginning "class struggle" of the post-industrial society, as the worker-employer conflicts were the class struggle of industrial society. Facile as this may sound, I will try to elaborate in the paper, and particularly in the section on the Post-Industrial society.

2. The Tensions of Inclusion.

- a) The blacks. The crucial point here is that the basic demands of the blacks have been now, legitimated by the society (going back to the Supreme Court Decision in 1954), but the implementation has been unsatisfactory. The admission of an historic injustice to the blacks makes it difficult to resist most of the demands, including the extreme ones, and encourages the militants in the community. One can find an analogy here to the tensions of the 1930s and the inclusion of the disadvantaged working class, but the analogy is only a starting point. The discussion will elaborate under what circumstances the black issue might be mitigated or under what conditions it might be exacerbated.

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- b) The desire for participation. The rising demand for participation, the reaction to bureaucratization, portend increasing strains in organizational life. The chief question here is the flexibility of the system and its ability to respond.

3. Structural Changes in the Society: The Multiple Revolutions.

The general argument here is that a number of basic structural changes are taking place in the U.S. which are productive of tensions. The effort that follows is an attempt, schematically to identify the changes

- A. Demographic. A population increase of 30 % (from 150 million to 200 million) in two decades; the urban revolution; the migration of the blacks to the north
- B. The creation of a National Society. The revolutions in transportation and communication have created, for the first time, a national society in which changes and shocks generated in one part have immediate repercussions in all others.
- C. The Communal Society. Two dimensions are evident here:
- 1) the rise of non-market (i.e. political) decision making. More and more allocative decisions are being made by the political decision makers rather than the market. Because politics is a visible arena, the number of conflicts inherently multiply
 - 2) the demand for "group rights" against individual rights (e.g. the blacks, the poor, etc.)

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- D) The Post-Industrial Society. The increasing emphasis on knowledge and technical decision making, the strategic role of the University as the "gatekeeper" to place and privilege in the society. One crucial point here is that the University is assuming a "monopoly" position for entry into higher place in the society, and inevitably comes under attack.

4. The Crisis of Liberalism.

- A) The burden of politics. Liberal theory blithely assumed the necessity for more and more political decision-making. (I use liberal not in the classic European sense, but its ~~welfare~~ welfare and statist version.) It did not foresee the multiplication of problems from the entry of more claimants in the system.
- B) The lack of technical knowledge. The easy assumption was that all one needed was "good ideas" and "good values." Yet it turns out that social planning and social engineering is highly complicated and that we lack the knowledge how to do many of the simplest things required to provide necessary services for people.

* * *

Some of these strains are indigenous to the U.S. (e.g. the Blacks); some are of a more general character. The conclusion will attempt to deal with each dimension.

Bilderberg Conference
Sources of Instability in the United States
Daniel Bell

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For anyone considering the United States little more than a decade ago, a question about the sources of political and social instability would seem an improbable one. The United States was then seemingly at the height of its powers. The Communist world, after the 1956-57 events in Poland and Hungary, was apparently falling into disarray. Domestically, there had been eight years of relatively high prosperity at stable prices. The threat of radical-right extremism, in the shadow of Joe McCarthy and his depredations, had faded away. Social justice for the Negroes was under way, beginning with the epochal Supreme Court decision of 1954 (Brown vs. the Board of Education in Topeka), which had legitimated the Negro claim for integration; and the Administration itself had taken the highly symbolic step of sending federal troops into Little Rock, Arkansas, a Southern community, to assure the right of black children to enter white schools. Like the public personality of President Eisenhower himself, the country seemed bland, self-assured, and eager to advance the broad, if platitudinous, conceptions of universalism in foreign affairs and progress at home.

There were some small clouds on the horizon. Economic growth had slowed down so that by the end of the decade it was no longer rising at a sufficient rate to match the increases in the labor force and in productivity. From 1953 to 1960, the labor force grew at a rate of 1.5 percent a year while productivity was rising at a trend rate of 3.2 percent. It would have required a growth in G.N.P. of about 4.5 percent to provide the necessary number of jobs to meet these growths, but output, which had been as high as 5.2 percent a year between 1947 and 1953, slowed to 2.4 percent between 1953 and 1960, and the result was an increase in unemployment. By the end of the decade, unemployment had risen to more than 6 percent of the labor force. But because the greater number of unemployed were black and unskilled, with little means for becoming politically effective, the unemployment situation, for the while, was ignored. Toward the end of his term, President Eisenhower began running a large budget deficit to increase demand, but the effort did not reach a growing number of "hard-core" unemployed.

In the foreign field, the victory of Fidel Castro in Cuba, and the inability to reach an accord with him (a matter as much the fault of Castro as of the fumbling State Department), gave rise to apprehensions about a possible Soviet foothold in the Western Hemisphere. And the United States began to organize clandestine efforts to overthrow him.

The paradox of the Kennedy administration was that its very élan, and activism -- the need to seem and be effective -- in many respects, both in the foreign field as well as at home, stimulated and unleashed the forces of turbulence

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which rack the United States today. In foreign affairs there was, first, the disaster at the Bay of Pigs--the humiliation of American power and a question of its will. At Vienna, Khrushchev thought he had taken the measure of John F. Kennedy and was emboldened to place missiles in Cuba, a confrontation from which he backed down and restored the credit of Kennedy. In Vietnam, where Eisenhower had shied away from large-scale commitments (despite the pressure of Secretary Dulles and Chief of Staff Radford), Kennedy made the fateful decision, after the fall of Diem, to step up American activity in the field and to move American soldiers and weapons into direct action, despite a warning by Under-Secretary George Ball about the drastic consequences of that move.

In the domestic field, the Kennedy administration began a helter-skelter effort to improve the lot of the poor and the blacks, but one of the paradoxical consequences of those efforts, notably in the poverty program, was to provide a large number of jobs and to create small political bases and machines for activists who would use their positions to organize community action groups, and to increase political agitation in the black and poor communities. A revolutionary movement always has the problem of how to finance its activities and to provide time for functionaries to ply their agitation; one of the astonishing aspects of the Kennedy, and Johnson, war on poverty was to facilitate the growth of a movement which would, in part, mount political pressure, if not a political war, on the Administration itself.

It would be absurd to assume that such agitation and turbulence might not have come to the fore. The classic illustration of the trajectory of expectations, first laid down by Tocqueville and repeated tediously since then by social scientists, tells us that no society which promises justice and slowly begins to open the way, having admitted the legitimacy of the claims, can expect to ride out the consequent whirlwind in a comfortable fashion. But along with the rising tumult of the blacks and the disadvantaged came an ambiguous war, and the combination of the two, which reinforced each other, has led to rising domestic violence, the alienation of the youth, and the growing challenge to the legitimacy of the system among the intelligentsia and the leadership cadres of the young, all of which have brought into question the very stability of the system itself.

It would be equally foolish to assume that immediate and manifest causes, important as they are, can wholly disorient a society as large and powerful as the United States. Underneath, there have occurred upheavals, sociological and technological, which have been reworking the social structure of the society. These changes, four in number--the simultaneous creation of an urban society, a national polity, a communal society, and a post-industrial world--will outlast the immediate vicissitudes of the war and poverty and continue to create deeper upheavals and tensions in the society. And beyond these structural changes in the society lie three other areas of difficulty which will profoundly affect the future of the United States: the relation of democracy to empire and the question whether any democracy can maintain an imperial role; the participation revolution, with its challenge

to technocratic and meritocratic modes of decision making; and the profound changes in culture, with fundamental anti-rational and anti-intellectual bias in the arts and in the modes of experience and sensibility.

Any paper seriously considering the future of the United States would have to deal with these three dimensions: the immediate political and social upheavals; the structural changes; and the fundamental questions of value and cultural choices. Within these confines, I can only be schematic about each. And if one is to consider these questions in the light of the problem of social and political instability, one must also turn, at first, to the consideration, at the level of sociological theory, of those factors which precipitate instability and revolution or counter-revolution in a society.

II

The Sources of Instability

The key question for any political system--this is the triumph of Max Weber over Marx in contemporary social thought--is the legitimacy of the system. As S. M. Lipset has written:

Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society. The extent to which contemporary democratic political systems are legitimate depends in large measure upon the ways in which the key issues which have historically divided the society have been resolved.

While effectiveness is primarily instrumental, legitimacy is evaluative. Groups regard a political system as legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit with theirs.*

If one looks at Western political society in the twentieth century, one can identify a number of factors which, in varying combinations, have resulted in the social instability of the society and the consequent loss of legitimacy for the political system.

1. The existence of an "insoluble" problem: The unemployment problem of the 1930's was regarded by most societies as insoluble. Clearly few of the bourgeois democratic regimes knew what to do to reverse the depression. Every Western society was plunged into crisis at the time. It was only the acceptance of "unorthodox" economic policies that permitted these economies to recover. The depression, clearly, was one of the forces conducive to fascism in the 1930's.

* S. M. Lipset, Political Man (New York, 1963), p. 64.

2. The existence of a parliamentary impasse: In Italy, Portugal, and Spain, in the 1920's and 1930's, the continuation of a parliamentary impasse, created by the polarization of forces in the society, impeded any effective government and contributed to a sense of helplessness in the populace which was crystallized either in the action of a mob, or an authoritarian dictator, or a military coup.

3. The growth of private violence: In Germany, and in similar countries, the creation of private "armies" and the growth of open street violence, uncontrolled by the government, led to the breakdown of authority.

4. The disjuncture of sectors--because of rapid industrialization in some areas and a large-scale agricultural lag in others--has led, as in Brazil today, to continuing instability.

5. Multi-racial or multi-tribal conflicts--as in India, before partition, between Hindu and Muslim, or in India between different language groups; in Nigeria between the regions representing different tribes; in Belgium between Flemish and Walloons; in Canada between English and French, etc.--are an obvious source of instability.

6. The alienation of the intelligentsia: the cultural elites carry the integrative symbols of the society, and the disenchantment of these groups has been a feature of almost every revolutionary situation. The defeat of Batista, in large measure, arose from the opposition of the middle classes in Cuban society to the regime.

7. Humiliation in war. A crushing defeat often cracks a political system, as it did Wilhelminian Germany and Tzarist Russia, but a partial defeat, or one construed as humiliating, can be as disintegrating a force. The defeat of Russia by Japan in 1905, the first instance of an Occidental power losing to an Oriental nation since the invasions of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, represented a great psychological humiliation for the country. In Latin America, the first revolution since the Mexican overthrow of the aging dictator Porfirio Diaz, in 1910, came only in 1952, with the Bolivian National Revolution--despite the previous rise of socialist, Communist, populist and indigenista movements between the two world wars and the depression -- after the defeat of the country in the Chaco war, a defeat which shattered the standard expectations and values of the society and led the mass of young middle class whites and cholos to reject completely traditional politics and parties.*

Such a list is not exhaustive, but it does sum up the major political experience of the century. Within that framework, what can we say about the United States and, more specifically, of the factors which one can identify as the sources of instability and strain: the Vietnam war, the alienation of youth, the rancor of the blacks, and the multiplicity of social problems which derive from the structural changes in the society? Which of these are "soluble," and under what conditions; which have the potential for further strain?

* See, Herbert S. Klein: "The Crisis of Legitimacy and the Origins of Social Revolution: The Bolivian Experience," Journal of Inter-American Studies, January 1968.

III

The Break-up of Consensus.

The United States in the 1950's was a mobilized society. It was mobilized, primarily, to meet the threat of international Communism. After an initial demobilization in 1946-1947, there came a rapid build-up of arms. The Korean war brought about a vast expansion of a conventional arms force. NATO and SEATO extended these arms, under a presumed nuclear shield, around the world, and for the first time in American history a permanent military establishment had been created. Science, in considerable measure, was mobilized as well. The vast revolutions in military technology--the creation of hydrogen bombs, nuclear missiles, new means of propulsion of warheads--all went hand-in-hand with the vast expansion of research and development and the tying in of research institutions and universities to government.

A society mobilized to meet an external threat, where that threat can be unambiguously defined, unifies a country. Internal divisions are minimized or glossed over, compromises are made, and politics becomes focused on external affairs. It is striking to recall that in the 1930's, the United States was riven by sharp labor struggles which in their intensity approached the classical Marxist conceptions of naked class division. Yet when World War II broke out, these divisions were subordinated to the national effort and labor was brought into the government while industrial strike went from conflict to accommodation. In the 1950's, the threat of an aggressive Communism, particularly after the East European purge trials, the seizure of Czechoslovakia and the defenestration of Mazaryk, and the encirclement of Berlin, brought the liberal community to the support of the government against that threat.

By the end of the 1950's, the situation had changed. International Communism was no longer a monolith. Evil no longer seemed unambiguous. Different kinds of Communism had come to the fore. The United States was in the quixotic position of providing aid to Tito and even to Gomulka. If the Soviet Union was still expansionist, that aggressiveness was more and more defined in traditional great-power terms than as ideological fervor. The moralism which had animated American foreign policy for a decade, particularly in the rhetoric of John Foster Dulles, had become attenuated. Ironically, moralism, a feature of the American style, was increasingly taken over by the opponents of the society, by the New Left, who began to characterize the United States in the same "totalistic" terms (as evil, sick, and bankrupt) as the United States previously had characterized its political enemy, and who began to picture American society itself in monolithic terms by such phrases as "the system," etc.

The break-up of the Communist world thus made it difficult to sustain a mobilized posture on ideological grounds. The emergence of such figures as Castro and Ho Chi Minh provided ready symbols for the latent revolutionary romanticism

of youth to respond to Castro, along with Ché, had shown that the Leninist myth of a handful of dedicated revolutionaries toppling a society could, like progressive revelation, recur in a big power world. Ho, for many (despite the fact that peasant uprisings in the North, as in 1956, had been suppressed, and dissident radicals had been murdered), became the symbol of purity and selflessness, an idealistic avuncular figure in a harsh and impersonal world.

Looked at historically, it is the 1950's, not the 1960's, that are the exception. The degree of national consensus, in part through willing agreement, in part through the silence of those who felt cowed, was itself momentary. What one sees, then, in the 1960's, is the resumption of an historic leftism in American and other societies. This leftism itself has no unified character. It is in part (in origin, at least) the drive towards "inclusion" in the society, particularly of the blacks and the poor; it is also, especially among the literary intelligentsia, part of the cultural rebellion, an anti-bourgeois attitude in the United States which goes back principally to the period before World War I when Van Wyck Brooks, picking up the distinctions of Matthew Arnold, divided the society into highbrows and middlebrows, and together with other writers led an attack on the "puritanism" of the culture; and, in other measure, this leftism takes on the features of anarchism and nihilism, a revolt against the increasing pressures of the technocratic organization of life in the society.

IV

The Tension of Inclusion.

The most obvious point of strain in American society, domestically, is race. The militancy of the blacks, the fact of riot, the threat of further strife are pervasive. How did it all come about?

The starting point for any social inquiry is "Why now, not then; why here, not there?" The primary clue to the changing political role of the American Negro is the recent, and remarkable, demographic shift. In 1910, about ninety percent of the Negroes in the United States lived in the South. As late as 1950, sixty-eight percent still lived there. 1960 was the "dividing year"; at that point half the Negro population was now in the North, and the balance has been shifting strongly in this decade.

It was not only that the Negro has been leaving the South; he has become urbanized as well. In 1910, just about three-fourths of the Negroes lived in rural areas; by 1960, almost three-fourths lived in cities. In 1960, in fact, for the first time in American history, American Negroes had become more urban than whites.

But in moving North and becoming urban, a significant new pattern was developing as well--the concentration of Negroes in a few major cities. Thus,

in 1960, there were over one million Negroes in New York City, about 890,000 in Chicago, 670,000 in Philadelphia, 560,000 in Detroit, and more than 335,000 in Los Angeles. By contrast, the largest southern concentrations were 215,000 Negroes in Houston and 186,000 in Atlanta.

These concentrations have gone together with another social development-- the movement, sometimes a flight, of the white population to the suburbs. This has meant that within the central city limits, the Negro population forms a significant proportion of the whole. Perhaps symbolic of the change is the fact that Negroes constitute more than fifty-five percent of the population of Washington, D. C., the nation's capitol.

What this population density and social weight have done is to give the black community the possibility of political leverage which a unified polity could exploit effectively. This developing political power is the important background reason why the Negroes have been able to demand, more successfully than ever before, a change in the patterns of power.

This changing demographic and political map allows us to see how the black community begins to be able to mobilize effective social power. But by itself it does not explain the trajectory of the "civil rights revolution," the emergent black nationalism, or the temper of the black militants.

The turning point in the civil rights revolution was, clearly, the Supreme Court decision in May, 1954, which struck down the principle of segregation in public schools. In so doing, it emphasized the meaning of the term equality as the overriding value in judging social change. It stated that blacks should have full and equal access to public facilities and services in the nation. But there were two further sociological consequences to this decision. One was the fact that the highest court in the land had legitimated the demands of the Negroes; and, second, that the moral initiative had passed into the hands of the blacks. The burden of proof was now no longer on the Negro but on the white.

What the Court had done was to admit the historic injustices done to the Negroes (specifically, an 1883 Supreme Court action declaring illegal the post-Civil War legislation of Congress which, at that time, had granted full civil rights to Negroes; that Court action had opened the way to "Jim Crow," or segregation, laws by southern states). In so doing, the Court made it difficult for any person or group to oppose the demands of the blacks even when some of these, by previous considerations, might be considered "extreme" (such as preference in admission to schools, or preference in hiring). When a nation has publicly admitted moral guilt, it is difficult to say no to the ones it has offended. And when a nation admits moral guilt, but goes slow in restitution, then the explosive mixture becomes even more inflammable.

The chief dilemma, of course, is the definition of "slow." When expectations of change rise rapidly, the trajectory of hope inevitably will spiral faster than reality. Inevitably there will be a disjunction between objective change and subjective assessment. Many blacks, for example, claim that conditions for them have worsened. But what they clearly mean is that they are not where they expected to be. A conservative measures social change by the distance from the past; a revolutionist from some mark in the future. If one looks at the record, a number of distinct gains have been registered. The largest gains have been among the Negro middle class. In the area of income, the percentage of families with an income of \$7,000 or more (in 1965 dollars) has risen sharply:

Family Income of \$7,000 or more

	Negro	White
1955	9 %	31 %
1966	28	55
South	15	46
Outside the South	38	59

In education, the picture shows equal trends. In 1960, 36 percent of Negro males and 63 percent of whites over 25 years of age had completed high school; by 1966 the figures were 53 percent for Negro and 73 percent for white males. In higher education, in 1960, 3.9 percent of Negro males and 15.7 percent of whites had completed college. In 1966, 7.4 percent of Negro males and 17.9 percent of whites had completed college, an increase of 90 percent in Negro college graduates over the period.*

But even such a picture of advance masks a more complicated aspect of mobility in the American social structure. If one looks at the various studies of achievement in the United States, most notably the so-called Coleman report on performance in the schools, it is clear that not race but social class is the primary variable. The educational achievement of a child is associated primarily with class milieu rather than race, religion, or color. The crucial point, of course, is that racial discrimination has been one of the chief means of maintaining class distance, and this has become the source of attack by the blacks. Thus, the current demand of the young blacks is primarily for open admission of all blacks to colleges, often regardless of performance or standards, since college is clearly seen as the major route of social mobility. One of the major variables,

* All figures are taken from the report, Social and Economic Conditions of Negroes in the United States, October 1967, a joint report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of the Census.

therefore, in any assessment of future strain in the society is the measure of the blacks' success in changing the class balance of the society.

The factors we have enumerated so far, regarding the position of the blacks, involve the changing demographic and political weights, the legitimation of demands, and an identification of the focal point of change. To this, one has to add, of course, a major consideration regarding any social movement--the nature of its leadership. The rising new leadership of the blacks is young, militant, and aggressive. In this there is a curious psychological paradox, in that a second generation which has not experienced the kind of direct humiliation inflicted on their elders, and which has often (as in the case of literary figures) received special largess, is psychologically more assertive and more outspoken and extreme. There are several intertwined reasons for this: the elders, facing more difficult circumstances, had to be more accommodating in order to achieve gains, and in the process often acquired an inner stoicism; the young can be more extreme because there are fewer "penalties" and, indeed, more rewards. Since the overall society is, in principle, receptive to change, individuals can more easily outbid one another in being more "left" and more "extreme". More important, perhaps, in the effort to achieve an internal cohesion and a group identity, the assertive emphasis on nationality, on a common past, on the positive features of black life becomes a necessary means of achieving a sense of psychic independence. And raucous as this process may be, it is a necessary one for any group which seeks to achieve a coherent sense of itself as a group.

In sum, the major thrust of the blacks in American life, in politics and in economic life, is not an effort to "overthrow" the society, but an effort to change the class balance. It is a drive for inclusion, in a radical way, accompanied by a cultural and psychological mood which, paradoxically, emphasizes revolutionary sentiments. The fact that the blacks are such a small minority of the country--though a large proportion of the major urban areas--makes a genuine revolutionary situation enormously difficult. If the black community achieves a sense of rapid enough inclusion in the society--and this is as much a subjective question as an objective one--the revolutionary language of the black intelligentsia will become, if it persists, an empty ideology and mere rhetoric. If the sense of failure increases, then the mood of resentment will lead to further riots and strife. We will return to the conditions under which one or the other might occur towards the close of this essay.

V

The Crisis in Credibility.

The sense of disorientation, clearly, is widespread in the United States today. The alienation of the young and the militancy of the blacks are widely publicized phenomena. The rapidity of social change is always unsettling to large masses of the population, and the sense of rapid social change, technological and sociological, is perceived everywhere. To get a sense of the mood of the country

as a whole, however, it might be interpreted as a sign of alienation, but to the traditional sectors of life which have been the source of stability of any culture, specifically religion. Let us turn, therefore, to some poll data about present-day attitudes towards religion. While interpretation of polls is not seriously difficult, if the same question is asked over a period of time, one gains a useful indicator of change in attitudes. Probably the most interesting question about the feelings of Americans about religion is the Gallup Poll which asked the question, "At the present time, do you think religion as a whole is increasing its influence on American life, or losing its influence?"

	Losing	Increasing	Same
April 1968			
National Sample	67 %	19 %	8 %
Protestant	69	17	8
Catholic	61	24	8
April 1967			
National	57	23	14
Protestant	60	21	13
Catholic	45	31	16
April 1965			
National	45		
April 1962			
National	31		
April 1957			
National	14		
Protestant	17		
Catholic	7		

Some variants of these questions reveal the shadings of these troubled moods. To the question, in July 1968, "Do you believe that life today is getting better or worse in terms of religion?":

	Better	Worse	No Difference	No Opinion
National	26 %	50 %	16 %	8 %
Protestant	24	51	17	8
Catholic	34	47	17	8

To the question: "Do you believe that life is getting better or worse in terms of morals?":

	Better	Worse	No Difference	No Opinion
National	8 %	78 %	16 %	2 %
Protestant	8	78	16	2
Catholic	8	81	10	1

Both questions are somewhat inexact, and one could argue that some individuals might feel that life is getting worse because religion is not doing enough for social change, and some because religion itself is becoming too lax. One would have to provide more detailed breakdowns to explore these issues. But what is clear is the deep pessimism of the country and, if one goes back to the first question, the remarkable shift of mood within the decade.

What is striking, of course, is that this shift of mood parallels the eight years of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the years of the New Frontier and the Great Society. The singular quality of the "tone" of the New Frontier was its sense of promise, symbolized in the vibrant words of the Kennedy inaugural speech and in the élan which characterized the arrival of a new generation in politics. How does one account for the change of mood in this decade? One can only be schematic, and indicate four factors:

1. The Multiplicity of Social Problems.

In the decade and a half after World War II, the country had been oriented primarily toward external affairs. Equally, the remarkable performance of American industry (and the psychological lift occasioned by the fact that there was no economic depression after the war, though it had been widely forecast by economists) seemed to indicate that economic growth would, in time, solve all social problems. The phrase The Affluent Society, as used by J. K. Galbraith, seemed to affirm this possibility, though the other side of the argument he presented--that public squalor was increasing while personal consumption was rising--was neglected in the first euphoric reviews of the book.

It is the sense of public squalor which is in large measure responsible for the growing sense of dismay. The Kennedy administration, as a Democratic administration, turned its eyes more readily than the previous, Republican administration to domestic affairs. It sought to make its record in that field. But that very effort itself focused public attention on questions that previously had been ignored: poverty, housing, education, medical care, urban sprawl, environmental pollution, and the like. On the one hand, there was the recognition of the poor. On the other, there was the psychological fact, as first remarked on by Bertrand de Jouvenel, that families were finding that their incomes had doubled, but that they were not living twice as well as before.

Whether such questions are "solvable" is moot, and further discussion will be postponed to a later section. But what is clear is that the rapidly heightened awareness of these multiple social questions has been instrumental in creating a sense of instability in the society.

2. The Black Riots and Crime.

From 1963 to 1967 there were "five hot summers" in which, each year,

there was a crescendo of rioting that, beginning in the South, passed quickly to the North, so that in Watts, Detroit, Newark and Washington, sections of each city went up in smoke. The Kerner Commission reports have shown that none of these riots was organized. In each instance, a small event, usually an instance of police brutality, or alleged police brutality, became a flare of wild rumors and the tinderbox exploded. As in any social movement, wild, episodic, rampaging behavior signals a first phase of action. The next phase is an effort to create more disciplined militant actions. In the black communities today, many contradictory currents are at work. There is predominantly the Black nationalism which now seeks to build distinct black institutions, and makes militant demands for resources towards those goals. But there are also movements such as the Black Panthers which emphasize guerrilla tactics and which are ready to link up with white radical movements.

The growth of black militancy is in considerable measure responsible for covert white "backlashes," a series of actions expressed most vividly, for a while, in the Wallace movement. Typically, the support for Wallace in the North came mainly from blue-collar workers and the ethnic groups in which they predominate, for the simple reason that these groups, in status adjacent to the blacks, have felt the most threatened. As upwardly mobile groups, these workers have bought their own homes and created small neighborhoods, and they feel that these status gains are threatened by the blacks.

Many of these fears are summed up in the issue of "law and order," and are focused principally on crime. To what extent crime has actually increased in the nation is difficult to determine. The F. B. I. crime index is notoriously unreliable and statistically wholly inadequate. The very nature of the gross statistics (which fail to use age-specific rates, or deflate for price changes, and which jumble different crimes into a single total) puts a heavy "inflationary" bias into the crime statistics of the country. But though we cannot measure the actual increases in the extent of crime, we can see that apprehension about crime has risen sharply, for many reasons. Touchy as the subject may be, it is clear that a disproportionate number of crimes today are committed by Negroes. This, in itself, should occasion no surprise. Crime is a form of "unorganized" class struggle, and the lowest groups in the society have always committed the disproportionate number of crimes. What was in the past true of the Irish and the Italians is true of the Negroes today. But Negro crime is more "visible", and, meshed with the general tensions in the society, it causes more comment and fear.

3. The Alienation of Youth

One can find many sources for the growing alienation of youth in America-- and in any advanced industrial society. There is a common structural source, which is, I believe, the dropping of an "organizational harness" on youth, and at an earlier and earlier age. The student rebellions today are, to simplify, the beginning "class struggles" of the post industrial society, just as the Luddite and machine-wrecking movements of the 1815-1840 period presaged the worker-employer

class conflicts of industrial society.

A post-industrial society has many features, but the principal one is the changed educational requirements in the society. An educational system which used to reflect the status structure of the society now becomes the determinant of class position in the society. The second fact is that the work of the post-industrial society becomes more and more technical and, in the increasing specialization and division of labor, one finds a bureaucratization of intellectual employment, just as earlier there occurred the breakdown of skills among artisans and skilled mechanics. (The fact that a post-industrial society cannot continue under the model of a hierarchical, specialized division of labor and must find new collegial and "task" forces of organization is another question. The fact is that in these early stages the older patterns of organization are being repeated.)

In American society one finds these features among the young. There is a striking change of cohort, an increase of about one-third in their number, and a consequent sense of increased competition for place. There is a reduction of the status of the college. A generation ago, going to college was still a distinctive fact about status. Today, in the elite schools, more than 85 percent of the graduates go on to some post-graduate work, so that in these places the college becomes simply a way-station. In the large public universities, to use Martin Meyerson's phrase, the "elect" have now become only the "electorate." And all this means increasing pressure on the young. In secondary school there arises the anxiety, will I get into college, will I get into a good college? In college there is the question: can I get into graduate school? In the nature of the modern technological revolution, there is the awareness that a college degree, even an advanced one, is no longer the means of stepping onto the high plateau of society rather, advancement involves a continual process of professional training and retraining in order to keep up with the new techniques and new knowledge being produced. In short, much of the alienation of the young is a reaction to the social revolution that has taken place in their own status.

4. The Vietnam War.

~~If there is any single element which is the catalyst of all social tensions in the United States, and perhaps even in the world, it is the Vietnam War. The war is without parallel in American history. It is perceived as morally ambiguous, if not dubious, by a large portion, perhaps the majority, of the population. And in the conduct of the war there has arisen a critical problem of credibility which, in extreme cases, is threatening to become a problem of legitimacy for the society.~~

In most countries, there is a distinction between the nation and the national government. One can be opposed to the government, yet not call into question one's allegiance to the nation. In the United States, because the government has often faithfully reflected a broad consensus of the society, that distinction has never been that clear. An attitude of opposition to the government, from an extreme, often leads to a rejection of the society. And this has been

particularly true among the radical young in the United States.

The creditability problem arose simply because the official optimism of the Administration, particularly during 1964 and 1965, was belied by events. The decisions to increase the number of troops, totalling a half million Americans, to bomb the North; to deflect peace attempts were continually justified on the ground that "one more step" would move the United States to victory. To some extent the personality of President Johnson was a factor, in that his secretiveness and unwillingness to be frank about specific situations led to increased suspicion and skepticism on the part of many people. But this was not a matter of personality alone, but an attitude throughout the government. At one point the creditability of the Council of Economic Advisors as an independent source of economic data was imperiled because the Pentagon had withheld data on the spending in Vietnam, and the estimates of the Council were considerably off, in consequence.

But obviously it has not been a problem of creditability alone. There is the moral question that the means employed have been highly disproportionate to the ends. The mass bombing, the defoliation of large areas, the mass transplanting of the population, the large number of deaths, all raise crucial moral issues which the Administration has by and large avoided. In the later years of the Johnson administration, it became increasingly clear that the basic strategy in the field was being dictated by the military, and such questions as means and ends, or the political effects of certain military policies, were not being considered.

The final element in the dégringolade of the Johnson policies was the evident impotence of the military strategy. The bombing was highly ineffective. The search-and-destroy tactics extended the American lines and left the cities vulnerable to the stunning Tet offensive which erupted simultaneously at almost a hundred points. For the American right, this impotence is especially infuriating because it challenges the sense of omnipotence which has been one of the myths of American power. It has therefore demanded, as General Le May demonstrated in the 1968 campaign, the extension of bombing and the destruction of Haiphong, on the ground that only more massive action would win the war. Yet the Administration did not pursue this line for the clear reason that a further escalation from the American side would be matched by an equal escalation of North Vietnamese manpower and Soviet arms. But this very admission, made privately, could only heighten the sense of a stalemate, and of American impotence.

For the young, the Vietnam war has been the single most direct source of alienation. The draft has increased anxiety about careers and the future. Service in the armed forces is often regarded as at best a waste of years and at worst an immoral complicity. Impotent themselves in affecting the course of national policy--or so they have thought--the student generation has turned its fury against the University as a symbol of the society. As two observers of a recent campus strike observed: "Until the war in Vietnam became the central political issue of

the nation, the coalition of faculty, administrators, and black and white student activists was fairly stable. Trust was high; black students and white radicals, while militant in some cases, were not yet revolutionary. By the end of 1968, trust nearly disappeared from the campus at State and, we expect, from many other campuses as well."

For the radical student, the University is not a disinterested sanctuary where truth is sought but an institution which meshes with other sections of the society, and in particular, in the case of research, with the military. That much of this is exaggerated is beside the point. In turning against the society any relation with government becomes suspect, and in the "distancing" of the student from the society, "the system" becomes a reified villain guilty of all crimes. It is this estrangement of a large section of the future "elite" of the society from the society which is the greatest cost of the Vietnam war. Whether that estrangement can be overcome is equally one of the great questions about the source of future stability of the United States.

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The Structural Revolutions in the United States.

The discussion of any society risks the seduction of the transient and the tumultuous. These engage our energies and our passions, they absorb us in the present. Some of these issues are consequential for the future, some blaze forth, yet quickly turn to dry ashes.

Any meaningful discussion of a society has to try to identify certain deeper, persistent elements which are the shaping forces of the society. These are in the realm of values -- the legitimating elements of the society -- of culture, the realm of expressive symbolism and sensibility, and of social structure, the set of social arrangements which deal with the distribution of persons in occupation and in the polity, and with the allocation of resources to meet stipulated social needs. Within the limits of the present paper, I shall have to concentrate on the deeper, running changes in social structure, and must necessarily, because of the complexity of these changes, be schematic. Of the four major structural changes in the society as I define them, the first is the demographic transformation, the second the creation of a national society, the third the emergence of a communal society, and the fourth a post-industrial society. All these are taking place almost simultaneously. It is the synchronism of these multiple revolutions which, as found, has generated so many strains in the social system.

1. The Demographic Transformation.

Since the end of World War II, there have been three major demographic changes in the United States. The first has been a large population expansion, the second the rapid urbanization of the country, and the third the racial transformation

* James McEvoy and Abraham Miller, "The Crisis at San Francisco State College," Trans-Action, March 1969.

of the central cities of the major urban areas.

In the decade from 1950 to 1960, almost 28,000,000 persons were added to the population, a figure as large as the entire population increase in the seven decades from 1790 to 1860. From the end of World War II to the present, the population of the United States went from 140 million to 200 million, an increase of more than 42 percent in less than a quarter of a century.

In percentage terms, these increases do not seem especially large. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the average increase of the population, per decade, was about 25 percent. The post-war increases are about 20 percent a decade. Yet there are two crucial elements, sociologically, in the difference between the past and the present. One is the meaning of a change of scale. A population increase from five to seven million, between 1800 and 1810, is a large one for a country in percentage terms. Yet the change in scale from 150 million to 180 million while smaller in percentage makes an enormous difference in scale. The second fact is a change in institutional structure. The early increases in population were largely segmental, in that the new units simply extended the chain of the society in different spatial directions; the new increases are pyramidal: they come on top of the existing population and add new interdependencies. In a high-consumption society, built on a complex infra-structure, the addition, quite quickly, of a large percentage to the population creates vast new demands for services such as medical care for children, playgrounds, schools, transportation, and the like. More than 40 percent of the population is under twenty years of age, and this large cohort, coming into the society in a giant wave, raises great problems. If one looks ahead, it seems likely that by 1980 the population will have risen to 250 million, and by the year 2000 (using a median projection) to about 300 million.

By 1980, 75 percent of the people in the United States will reside in urban areas. There will be 165 cities with a population of 100,000 or more, compared with 100 in 1960. There will be twice as many metropolitan areas with over one million population, and eleven areas (Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore-Washington, Miami, Detroit, Cleveland, Chicago, St. Louis, Los Angeles and San Francisco-Oakland) will have over five million. The New York metropolitan area alone will have 20 million inhabitants. (As a corollary, the number of automobiles in use will rise from 59 million in 1960 to slightly above 120 million in 1980.)

And within the central cities we see equally important shifts. From 1960 to 1966, for the first time in American history, there was an absolute decline in the white population in the central cities (by .3 percent), while the white population of the suburbs increased 21.3 percent in that six-year period. In the same period, the nonwhite population of the central cities increased by 23.9 percent, and in the suburbs by 10.1 percent. Before long, if present movements persist,

ten of the major cities of the United States will be more than 50 percent Negro. Washington, D. C., passed that mark almost a decade ago. Newark, which in the 1960 census was 34.4 percent Negro is now more than 50 percent black. In Detroit, Baltimore, Cleveland, and St. Louis, Negroes constitute more than a third of the population. New Orleans, Memphis, and Atlanta are each about 40 percent Negro.

To deal with such magnitudes one can do little better than cite the statement of President Johnson in 1967, in his "Message on the Cities": During the next fifteen years, thirty million people will be added to the cities, the equivalent of the combined populations of New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit and Baltimore. Each year, in the coming generation we will add the equivalent of fifteen cities of 200,000 persons each. By 1975 we will need two million new homes a year over and above our present rate. We will need schools for ten million additional children, as well as welfare and health facilities for five million persons over the age of sixty.

"In the remainder of this century," the President eloquently pointed out in his message, "urban population will double, city land will double, and we will have to build in our cities as much as all that we have built since the first of us first arrived on these shores. It is as if we had forty years to rebuild the entire urban United States."

It is this vast demographic and ecological upheaval which frames the present and future tasks of American society.

2. The National Society.

The United States is, for the first time, a national society. It has long been a "nation" in the sense of achieving a national identity and a national symbolism. But it is only in the last thirty years, because of the revolution in communication and transportation, that the United States has become a national society in the fundamental sense that changes taking place in one section of the society have an immediate and repercussive effect in all the others. One can see this most clearly in the "contagion effects" of the race situation. The pictures on national television of police dogs snarling at Negro marchers in Selma, Alabama, brought so widespread a reaction that in forty-eight hours 10,000 people joined Martin Luther King in a new march.

There are three broad problems which one can identify as a consequence of the emergence of a national society.

a) The fact that social problems become national in scope. The ease of migration throughout the country and the variability in conditions add burdens to particular parts. One can see this in the picture of welfare in New York City

In 1959, there were 240,000 persons on welfare (i.e., receiving monetary aid because they were unable to work) in New York, at a cost of \$235 million dollars. By 1968, almost a million persons were on welfare, and at the projected rate of growth, by 1970, 1,300,000 persons will be on welfare at a cost of \$1 billion, 700 million dollars. Unless national standards are created, New York must carry the burdens of a large part of the country.

b) **The inadequacy of the present administrative structure.** The United States is composed of 50 states which, under the Constitution, have responsibility for the health, education and welfare of their citizens. But what, in a national society, is the rationale for such small entities as Rhode Island, Delaware, New Jersey, Maryland, which have a small tax base, whose populations tend to work in other states, and whose costs of administration remain high? At the other end of the scale is the fact that there are 80,000 municipalities in the United States, each with its own tax and sovereign powers. This is not decentralization, but disarray. The extraordinary fact is that while the United States has the most modern economy in the world, its polity remains Tudor in character, antiquated top-heavy with a multiplicity of overlapping jurisdictions such as townships, counties, cities, plus special entities like health districts, park districts, sewage districts, water districts, etc. The failure of an efficient administrative structure is itself a contributing element to the inability of cities or regions to have any effective planning.

c) **The rise of plebiscitary politics.** In the United States there has been an eclipse of spatial distance. One of the consequences is to make Washington the central cockpit for all political argument and to focus attention on a single source. Given the possibilities for violence which have been endemic in the system, a new source of great strain has been created by the emergence of a national society.

One can look at the problem in this light. If one compares the history of the United States with that of Europe, there has probably been more labor violence in America than in any country on the Continent. Few statistics are available, but if one takes as rough indicators the number of persons killed, the number of times troops have been called in, the number of strikes, the number of man days lost, etc., it is evident, I think, that there has been violence in the United States, but with much less political and ideological effect than in Europe. One of the chief reasons is that, unlike Europe, much of this violence took place at the perimeters of the society, rather than the center, and it took considerable time for these effects to take hold. Today, labor issues have been institutionalized. But other fractious problems remain. And the possibilities for "mobilization politics," of organizing direct pressures, are high. To make one other comparison: in 1893, in the midst of a severe economic depression, a group of unemployed, the so-called "Coxey's Army," began a march on Washington from Massillon, Ohio. Ten thousand men started out, but by the time they reached Washington some weeks later the ranks had dwindled to a handful. In 1963, Martin Luther King and A. Philip Randolph called

for a March on Washington, and in forty-eight hours almost a quarter of a million persons had descended on the nation's capitol.

Given the fact that political conflicts are bound to multiply -- for reasons spelled out in the next section -- the increased possibility for mass pressure as a means whereby any group can obtain its demands becomes a further source of structural strain in the system.

3. The Communal Society.

The emergence of a communal society derives from two factors: the growth of non-market public decision making, and the definition of social rights in group, rather than individual, terms. In scale, both are distinctly new on the American scene, and both pose new kinds of problems for the society.

a) By non-market public decision making, I mean simply the growth of problems which have to be settled by the public authorities -- rather than through the market mechanism. The laying out of roads, the planning of cities, the organization of health care, the payment for education, the cleaning up of environmental pollution, the building of houses all become matters of public concern. No one can buy his share of "clean air" in the market; one has to use communal mechanisms in order to deal with pollution.

Now there is one crucial problem which emerges from this shift. The "virtue" of the market is that it disperses responsibility. When a "decision" is reached by the multiple choices of thousands or millions of individual consumers, acting independently in the market, there is no one person or group of persons to blame for such decisions. If a product "does not sell," or there is a shift of taste, and firms or even entire industries fail because of such market decisions, no single group can be saddled with the charge of being responsible. But with non-market public decisions, the situation is entirely different. The decisions are visible -- and one knows whom to blame. In effect, decision making had become "politicalized" and subject to all the multiple, direct pressures of political decision making. The question whether a road is to go through the ghetto or the rich section of town, the location of a jet airport, a decision to centralize or decentralize schools, the character of a housing project, increasingly are settled by a public agency, and one can quickly tell who gains and who loses by such a decision.

The simple point is that while non-market public decision making becomes more necessary, for these are tasks which the individual cannot do for himself, such new mechanisms multiply the potentialities of community and group conflict. When one "burdens" the polity with more and more political issues, when housing, health education, et al., become politicized, strains are multiplied. The simple prediction is that in the coming years there will be, invariably, more and more group conflicts in the society.

How one meets this is not easy. One fundamental principle is to try and see that such conflicts do not take place along a single dimension (such as race or class), and thus polarize a society. The more "cross-cutting" the number of issues, the less the danger that conflicts will be generalized and widened. Second, one has to begin to establish mechanisms of political bargaining between groups by the specification of "trade-offs," i.e., the specification of demands which the group will give up in order to gain others. No single group in a society can have its own way, and the problem is to establish bargaining mechanisms between groups. Just as the labor strife of the 1930's was institutionalized by the creation of economic bargaining mechanisms, so the communal questions of the 1960's can be mediated by political bargaining.

b) By group rights, one means that claims on the community are decided on the basis of group membership rather than individual distinctions. Continental political theory has always recognized the Gemeinde, the Genossenschaft, the guild, the corporation, the commune and the burgh as group entities, possessing rights which are shared by the corporate group members. Anglo-Saxon political theory, beginning with Locke, has sought to find a philosophical grounding for the basis of individual rights, as natural rights. The American value system, moreover, has been predicated on the basis of individual achievement and equality of opportunity as given to individuals. Politically, certain functional groups have been recognized as having a collective character (e.g., trade unions), and rights were created that had this character. But, theoretically, these are voluntary associations, and a man loses those protections when he changes his status.

The current issue arises from the demands of the blacks for rights as a "property" of their color. The paradoxical fact is that the claim made by the blacks before the Supreme Court, in the 1954 school decision which struck down segregation, was that Negroes were entitled to be treated as individuals, and to achieve equality on that basis, rather than be treated as a category. But the slowness of integration and the psychological assertiveness of a group identity have changed the character of the black demands. As Nathan Glazer has put it, the Negroes have moved from a claim of equality of opportunity to equality of result. And this can be obtained, they argue, only through special quotas, preferential hiring, compensatory education, and the like.

The demand for group rights will widen in the society, because social life increasingly becomes organized on a group basis. The need to work out philosophical legitimations and political mechanisms to adjudicate these conflicting claims will be another source of strain in the society in coming years.

4. The Post-Industrial Society.

In a post-industrial society, which, I suggest, is only now beginning to emerge, we may see fundamental changes in the institutional structure of the society that will transform the stratification system of the society, principally

in the bases of class position and the modes of access to such position. The idea of a post-industrial society is not meant to be a total picture of social change. Industrial societies such as the United States of America, the U.S.S.R., Germany and Japan have been organized politically in different ways, and similarly the post-industrial society can assume varying political forms.

In a number of papers I have explored five different dimensions of a post-industrial society.* In this context, let me just emphasize one of them: the centrality of theoretical knowledge as the source of innovation and policy analysis in the society. One can see this in the changing relation of science to technology, and of economic theory to economic policy. What it suggests, in sum, is that technological advance and economic growth in a society become increasingly dependent on the codification of theoretical knowledge and on the technical character of policy analysis.

In a post-industrial society the University, because it is the place where theoretical knowledge is codified and tested, increasingly becomes a primary, if not the central, institution of the society. To this extent, the University becomes burdened with tasks greater than it has ever had to carry in its long history: it has to maintain a disinterested role as regards knowledge, yet become the principle service agency of the society not just in training people but as the source of policy advisors. At the same time "human capital," rather than money capital, becomes the scarce resource of the society. The identification of talent, the motivation and training of persons, become a self-conscious task for the entire educational system. In this way, too, the educational system assumes increased burdens.

In a post-industrial society, one will also see the development of an "intellectual technology," which, in importance, will replace the machine technology of an earlier century. The growth of new techniques such as linear programming, model construction, simulation, game theory, systems analysis and systems engineering, all give decisions an increasingly technical character. Technique can never define the goals of a society, yet the choice of means, to the extent that they affect goals, provides a greater power for technocrats in the society. The tension between technocratic and political decision making will become one of the chief features of a post-industrial society.

The character of a post-industrial society, if one looks at the recent history of the United States, leaves its imprint on international relations as well.

* The most comprehensive statement can be found in my monograph, "The Measurement of Knowledge and Technology," in the book Indicators of Social Change, edited by Eleanor Sheldon and Wilbert Moore, published by the Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1968.

If this is examined through the prism of imperialism and empire, one can define a simplified and schematic set of changes. In the early, nineteenth century phase, advanced economies exported manufactured products and bought primary products from other societies. In a second, classic phase of imperialism there was the export of capital rather than products. But the post-industrial society creates a different set of relationships: the export is chiefly advanced technology and organizational capability. It is for this reason that, increasingly, in the last decade the United States as an emergent post-industrial society has forged its economic relationships primarily with Europe, as the market for these capacities, rather than with Africa and even Asia.

In the most fundamental ways, a post-industrial society begins to reshape all modern economies. The emphasis on education as the mode of access to skill and power, the role of technical decision, the conflicts between skill groups and new elites (e.g., the scientific community and the military) all presage new kinds of difficulties for advanced Western societies, and for the United States in particular.

VII

The Future: In the Short and Long Run.

This paper is already too long, and an adequate discussion of the problems still to be defined would be as lengthy as the sum of the preceding sections. Inevitably, therefore, I have to be even more schematic than before.

The immediate, pervasive question before the society is not the issue of the blacks, tense as this is, but the alienation of the sensitive young. The drive of the blacks is still for inclusion in the society, even though many want this on their terms (e.g., an education adapted to black needs), and the problem is the transfer of resources to meet those demands.

The mood of the radical and revolutionary young is more diffuse and inchoate. There is no sense of a coherent set of demands, other than a generalized attack on prevailing middle-class values which traditionally, in bourgeois terms, means delayed gratification, psychological restraints, and rationalistic and technocratic modes of thought. The Vietnam war has given a sharp and immediate focus to their discontents. For a small and significant group this has led to a complete alienation from the society and the readiness to become "urban guerrillas" in an effort to destroy the society, and, failing that, the University as a symbol of the society.* Insofar as generational conflict has

* An illustration of that extreme mood can be found in the statement by Carl Davidson, an officer of S.D.S., in November 1967: "The institutions [which] our resistance has desanctified and delegitimized, as a result of our action against the oppression of others, have lost all authority and hence all respect. As such, they have only raw, coercive power. Since they are without legitimacy in our eyes, they are without rights." In short, one has here the prescription for destructive actions.

become a focus of differences in the society, it will continue for a long time. Currently, as a recent U.N.E.S.C.O. document has noted, 54 percent of the world's population is below the age of 25 (in the United States, in 1960, it was 44 percent), and the proportion of the young in society is expected to increase.

Moral questions apart, the ending of the Vietnam war is a necessary condition for the future stability of the United States. Only a quick end to this war will reduce many of the tensions felt by the young, only the redirection of resources (about \$30 billion a year) can begin to meet the problems of the blacks and the poor.*

But clearly the ending of the Vietnam war is only the beginning. The many problems identified above, particularly those deriving from the structural changes in American life, remain. Beyond these, however, are five more generalized problems which a troubled society has only begun to be aware of and has yet to confront. Again, I have to be schematic:

1. The Relation of Democracy to Empire.

The United States after World War II could not go back to its earlier status of a parochial power, with its national life, as in the 1920's and before, dominated by the small town mentalities which had ruled it for so long. A new metropolitan and world outlook had emerged, and American policy increasingly became shaped by considerations of empire. The United States became an imperial power not because of any economic motivations but because, as the strongest power, it was drawn (and went) into the ensuing contest of will in all areas of the world, and thus it began to exert a predominant influence, if not hegemony.

In times of trouble, one goes back to the reading of Thucydides, and one is struck in this instance by the parallel situation of Athens after the Persian wars. What Thucydides posed was the dilemma of a democracy which had become saddled with empire, which, in fact, had chosen empire rather than retreat to a provincial role. Though no parallels are exact, the problems of Athens and the Delian Confederacy are extraordinarily suggestive of the situation of the United States vis-a-vis its own allies, and the problems with the Soviet (Spartan) bloc.

* The number of poor in the United States is being steadily reduced. In 1959, some 22 percent of the nation's households lived in poverty, by 1967 this had been reduced to 13.3 percent. During that period, the number of blacks below the poverty line declined from 55 percent to 35 percent. According to the 1969 report of the Council of Economic Advisors, it would cost \$9.7 billion to bring all the poor above the poverty line. (See p. 153, Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisors, January, 1969.)

There is in Thucydides, especially in his description of the Corcyrean events, a forewarning of what happens in any society when violence unleashes civil passions. "In the confusion which life was now thrown in the cities, human nature, always rebelling against the law, and now its master, gladly showed itself ungoverned in passion, above respect for justice, and the enemy of all superiority...."

But the real problem is whether a democracy, potentially riven by discord between factions, can sustain a unity, especially in defeat, or even in victory sustain an expansive role as a leader and protector of other states without being driven (as was Cleon, the successor to Pericles, who is remarkably like Lyndon Johnson) to the temptations of large-scale risks.

An imperial role is difficult for any nation, since it means the commitment of large-scale resources, of men and wealth, which either have to be returned with profit or which cause deep strain within. The relation between democracy and empire is especially trying, and increasingly one can see that the imperial role is not one that is fitting, in political structure and national style, for the United States.

2. The Creation of a New Political Elite.

An elite, at best, as in an Establishment, serves as a source of moral authority and political wisdom. What has been interesting about the United States is that in the decade and a half following World War II, a more or less coherent political elite emerged that provided, in the area of foreign policy, a degree of leadership. An elite is sometimes defined by its structural position in a society, but the fact that men possess economic or political or military power, or stand at the pinnacle of an organization, does not necessarily mean they are an elite, in the sense that their leadership is followed. In the United States the elite that emerged was defined more by outlook -- a cosmopolitan and worldwide vision -- rather than by structural position alone. Men such as General Marshall, Henry Stimson, John McCloy, Robert Lovett, Dean Acheson, Douglas Dillon and others of the Foreign Policy Establishment were drawn, primarily, from the New York financial community, but it was not their interests that defined them as an elite, but their character and judgment. The important consideration was that their opinions had weight because they were respected. Reciprocity between judgment and respect is a necessary condition if policy is to be tempered by the weight of elite opinion.

American foreign policy after World War II was primarily oriented to Europe in the first measure because the tasks of reconstruction were most necessary there. But the policies that emerged, principally the Marshall Plan, arose, too, because of the experience and interests of these men in European affairs. There never was a similar group with comparable experience and judgment about Asia, and one of the failures of American foreign policy, to that extent,

derives from this fact.

In the last decade, the influence of that major political elite has been disappearing, and no comparable elite has arisen to temper policy and to provide a source of judgment. The Kennedy Administration sought, self-consciously, with its panache and élan, to constitute itself as an elite, and among the intellectuals and the young it gained an enthusiastic following if not a moral authority. But this ended with the death of the young President.

Given the divisions in the society, the question whether an elite can emerge is moot. If one follows the wisdom of a Bagehot, the existence of such an elite is a necessary element in the creation of political authority in the society. Without such an elite there is a problem of authoritative leadership.

3. The Failure of Liberalism?

To a considerable extent, liberal social policy was associated with the rise of Keynesianism and macro-economic planning. Just as the New Deal was the haven, in large measure, of young lawyers (symbolically from the Harvard Law School under Felix Frankfurter), because of the role of regulatory agencies, the New Frontier and the Great Society in its early days became associated with economists. Under the leadership of Walter Heller, the Council of Economic Advisors was transformed into a professional body whose advice on policy, particularly with the resounding economic success of the tax cut, became highly influential in government.

But economists were more than economists. They became managers as well. The McNamara revolution in the Pentagon was principally the work of economists led by Charles Hitch. The success of these cost-effectiveness techniques led to the adoption of the more general form of "rational management" by the rest of the government in the form of the Program-Planning Budgeting Systems (P.P.B.S.)

But in recent years there has been a growing skepticism about the ability of economists to manage the economy. Fiscal policy seems to have lost much of its lustre in the United States. In England, the Labour Government has been unable, despite the advice of a distinguished group (a "plague of economists," Michael Postan has called them), to solve Britain's difficulties. John Vaizey, an English Labourite economist, writing of the "incoherence in post-Keynesian thought," ends pessimistically: "Reluctantly, I think, one must conclude that running an economy to order may be beyond the power of analysis of present-day economists."

In social policy, particularly in the United States, the record of social scientists is even more dismal. In the areas of education, welfare, social planning, there has been little knowledge that one can draw upon for policy purposes. Social scientists have reluctantly begun to admit that the problems are more "complex" than they thought.

The failure of liberalism, then, is in part a failure of knowledge. This is not an answer to the liking of the New Left, which still press for the easy simplicisms. Yet this, too, is a source of intellectual disarray and concern when one realizes that a large, complex society, especially one that necessarily has to be "future-oriented," requires social planning in order to meet the onrush of social change.

4. The Participation Revolution.

What is evident everywhere is a society-wide uprising against bureaucracy, and a desire for participation, a theme that is summed up in the phrase "People ought to be able to affect the decisions that control their lives."

This upheaval from below takes many forms. In part, it is a revolt against the idea of a meritocracy in which technical achievement alone becomes the criterion of place in the society; in part, as in the case of the blacks, it is a form of community self-assertion. Certainly the older political forms are no longer adequate to meet this challenge.

To a considerable extent, the Democratic administration in the last several years did go far in starting to create new social forms to involve people in crucial decisions. The poverty program called for the creation of community action groups; in New York, for example, there are 26 neighborhood community councils created through the poverty program, which has been the source of a new political base--principally for Mayor Lindsay--in the city. The Model Cities Housing Program calls for community participation in the planning of new neighborhoods. The various educational reforms propose the creation of local bodies with power over the activities of the schools.

To a considerable extent, the participation revolution is one form of reaction against the "professionalization" of society, and the emergent technocratic decision-making of a post-industrial society. And every advanced industrial society will have to confront this phenomenon. What began years ago in the factory through the trade unions has now spread to the neighborhood--because of the politicalization of decision making in social affairs, described above in the section on the communal society--and will, in the coming years, spread to organizations as well. The older bureaucratic models of hierarchically organized, centralized organizations functioning through an intensive specialization and division of labor clearly will have to be overhauled.

Yet "participatory democracy" is not the panacea its adherents make it out to be, no more than older efforts at creating plebiscetarian political mechanisms such as the initiative, the referendum and the recall. With all the furor about "participatory democracy," it is curious that few of its proponents have sought to think through, on the most elementary level, the meaning of these changes. Certainly if individuals are to affect the decisions that change their lives, then

segregationists in the South would have the right to exclude blacks from the schools. But one would have to say that the South is not an independent political entity but part of a larger polity, and it would have to comply with the moral norms of the society. Similarly a small neighborhood group cannot be allowed to veto a city plan which takes into account the needs of a more inclusive polity. In short, "participatory democracy" is one more way of posing the classical issues of political philosophy; namely, who should make, and at what levels of government, what kind of decisions for how large a social unit. And there are no clear-cut answers to these questions. But the questions will remain, and they will become exacerbated.

5. The Change in Cultural Sensibility.

The most diffuse and the most amorphous, but eventually the most important, question--one which cannot be answered on a political level--is the change in cultural sensibility which is evident among large sections of the public. Among the young there is an evident change of life style which, in principle, may be no different than that described more than a century ago by Murger in his *Vie de Bohème*. But what was once restricted to a small group of artists and was largely hidden from the society has now become the property of many and is constantly publicized in the media and in films. One need not argue whether the new ethic--in sexual and personal relations--is more liberating or not, or whether the search for heightened experience through the use of drugs increases artistic perceptions. What is clear is that the dominant mode in the new cultural sensibility is anti-intellectual, and anti-rational, and this poses a very different question.

Philosophy, whether it be Pythagorean mysticism or Bergsonian intuition, has had its anti-intellectual currents, and literature, whether it be the intoxication of Rimbaud, the subterranean pleasures of Lautréamont, or the biological vitalism of Lawrence, has been anti-rational. Yet all these currents were constrained by the shaping discipline of art or the efforts to establish discourse. The newer sensibility, with its emphasis on polymorph-perverse pleasure, with its insistence on immediacy and involvement and its rejection of interpretation, has a different character. The artistic revolutions of the past sought to create new genres, and even when they were rhetorically nihilistic, like Futurism, they sought to establish a new aesthetic. So far, at least, the new currents simply remain at the level of anti-art.

Normally this would be a problem for the culture alone. But there are crucial sociological problems as well. For the new style in culture spills over into politics and seeks to justify the destruction of civility and discourse. At its most extreme, it seeks to substitute aesthetics for politics, and, in the nature of that kind of aesthetics, it becomes a justification of the gesture, and of the extreme act.

Beyond this is another, more troublesome fact: that what we are witnessing is an extreme disjunction between the culture and the social structure, the one being

devoted to apocalyptic attitudes, the other to technocratic decision-making. How a society can live with such a disjunction is a thorny question for the future.

Coda.

Schematic as this paper has been, there is no simple set of answers to be itemized, one, two, three, about the degree of stability or instability of the American system. I have tried to indicate the kind of problems that exist, and the deeper structural sources from which they are generated. In the crucial respect, the society has the resources to meet the immediate social problems, and since money is a great solvent, this is a considerable asset. In the past, the political system has been sufficiently flexible to accommodate new groups. The most immediate question is whether American society will be able to extricate itself from the quicksand of the Vietnam war. The long-range question is whether the diremption of the culture and social structure may not be too deep to be bridged, and whether the coherence of the society may be in jeopardy. In between are the questions which affect the broad mass of persons, their anxieties, their needs, their willingness to bear the costs of change and the degree of backlash which might arise from individuals whose status is threatened. The first requisite for action is intelligent leadership, and this is the most problematic question of all--for any society.